


"MISSION CREEP": A Case Study in U.S. Involvement in Somalia

A Monograph
By
Major Michael F. Beech
Infantry



19960924 036



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 95-96

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

ABSTRACT

"Mission Creep": A Case Study in US Involvement in Somalia by Major Michael F. Beech, USA, 61 pages.

This monograph explores the problem of mission creep. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The United States has struggled to find its place in the new world order. As a result US military forces have increasingly found themselves involved in various operations other than traditional warfare. Often the political aims of these operations are difficult to identify and translate into military operational objectives and end states. Worse yet, the political aims themselves are prone to rapidly shift and evolve from those originally intended, leaving the military commander the difficult task of catching up with policy or even guessing at the political objectives. This uncertain environment sets the conditions for the delinkage between the political goal and military operations which may result in disaster.

The monograph examines US operations in Somalia to provide the data for the analysis in order to determine the factors which contribute to mission creep. Examining US-Somalia policy from 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) to October 1993 (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) this monograph analyses the evolution of national policy objectives and the military and political operations undertaken to achieve those objectives. An analysis of operational and tactical objectives and end states as well as military methods determines the factors which contributed to the failed US involvement in UNOSOM II. In addition, the monograph identifies the Somali geo-political, historical, cultural, and economic factors which influenced US operations.

This monograph concludes that contradictory and uncoordinated national strategy and political policy resulted in poor operational planning and execution. There were also significant factors at the operational level which contributed to the failed US intervention. Military operations were not connected to the rapidly shifting political aims. Commanders cannot abrogate the responsibility of establishing clear and achievable objectives even in environment of strategic ambiguity. Implications discussed in the conclusions include an analysis of the United Nations ability to lead multinational peace operations and warnings for future US entanglements with the UN.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Michael F. Beech

Title of Monograph: "Mission Creep": A Case Study in US
Involvement in Somalia

Approved by:

Ernest H. Evans Monograph Director
Ernest H. Evans, Ph.D.

Danny M. Davis Director, School of
COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS Advanced Military
Studies

Philip J. Brookes Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

Accepted this 23d Day of May 1996

ABSTRACT

"Mission Creep": A Case Study in US Involvement in Somalia by Major Michael F. Beech, USA, 61 pages.

This monograph explores the problem of mission creep. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The United States has struggled to find its place in the new world order. As a result US military forces have increasingly found themselves involved in various operations other than traditional warfare. Often the political aims of these operations are difficult to identify and translate into military operational objectives and end states. Worse yet, the political aims themselves are prone to rapidly shift and evolve from those originally intended, leaving the military commander the difficult task of catching up with policy or even guessing at the political objectives. This uncertain environment sets the conditions for the delinkage between the political goal and military operations which may result in disaster.

The monograph examines US operations in Somalia to provide the data for the analysis in order to determine the factors which contribute to mission creep. Examining US-Somalia policy from 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) to October 1993 (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) this monograph analyses the evolution of national policy objectives and the military and political operations undertaken to achieve those objectives. An analysis of operational and tactical objectives and end states as well as military methods determines the factors which contributed to the failed US involvement in UNOSOM II. In addition, the monograph identifies the Somali geo-political, historical, cultural, and economic factors which influenced US operations.

This monograph concludes that contradictory and uncoordinated national strategy and political policy resulted in poor operational planning and execution. There were also significant factors at the operational level which contributed to the failed US intervention. Military operations were not connected to the rapidly shifting political aims. Commanders cannot abrogate the responsibility of establishing clear and achievable objectives even in environment of strategic ambiguity. Implications discussed in the conclusions include an analysis of the United Nations ability to lead multinational peace operations and warnings for future US entanglements with the UN.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction	1
II. Somalia	3
III. Operation Restore Hope	9
IV. A Bridge Too Far? United Nations Operations in Somalia II	24
V. Conclusions	40
Endnotes	46
Bibliography	57

I. Introduction

On 12 May 1994 the parents of three American soldiers who had been killed while conducting a raid to capture a Somali warlord stood before the President of the United States, William J. Clinton and his special advisor Anthony Lake in the Oval Office of the White House. The soldiers were three of the eighteen killed on 3 October 1993 in a vicious nine hour battle against a Somali armed faction on the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia. Part of an elite special operations task force sent to Somalia by the Clinton administration their mission was to capture a recalcitrant Somali warlord who was responsible for attacks against the UN forces. On 3 October the raid turned into a tragedy when several US helicopters were shot down while participating in the mission. Invited to the White House by the President, the parents demanded an explanation as to why the US was conducting the raids in the first place.

What had started nearly two years earlier as a purely humanitarian military intervention to feed thousands of starving Somalis who fell victim to famine and civil war, had somehow evolved into a battle against one of Somalia's warring factions. When questioned by the parents as to why US troops were trying to capture a Somali warlord, Clinton answered that when he received the reports of the casualties of the failed raid he himself was dumbfounded saying, "what in the world were we doing conducting a raid when we should be seeking a diplomatic solution?"¹ One parent, a Vietnam veteran, told the President he felt that his son had died for nothing.² The parents were dismayed by Clinton's remarks which seemed to suggest that the President was unaware of the military operations being conducted in Somalia.

Even more surprising than the tragedy itself was Clinton's declaration of his astonishment at discovering that US forces in Somalia were conducting raids to capture a clan leader. His statements suggest that military operations expanded beyond their

intended scope and purpose. Yet, Clinton had ordered the deployment of the special operations forces to Somalia. In addition, both their deployment as well as several raids prior to the 3 October tragedy were well documented in the media.³ In fact, the United Nations resolution calling for the capture of the Somali leader was strongly supported by the Clinton administration. In brief, the US not only helped form UN policy regarding the capture of clan leaders but also provided the forces to execute the man-hunts for the faction leaders. By exploring the circumstances surrounding the US intervention in Somalia this monograph will determine if and how the US military mission crept beyond the stated national policy objectives as Clinton suggested.

This monograph examines the evolution of national policy and military operations in Somalia which ultimately ended in failure and tragedy. Examining US- Somalia policy from 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) through October 1993 (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) this monograph analyses the evolution of national policy objectives and the military and political operations undertaken to achieve those objectives. An analysis of the operational and tactical objectives and end states as well as the military methods undertaken in Somalia will determine the factors which resulted in the failed US involvement in Somalia and will determine lessons with respect to future peace operations. Specifically, this monograph examines the application of operational art in Somalia for evidence of delinkage between national aims and tactical operations as well as evidence of mission creep. For the purpose of this analysis the term "mission creep" describes the phenomenon in which military operations expand beyond the original mission resulting in additional military tasks which directly conflict with the intended military and political outcomes.⁴ In order to fully understand the failed US intervention in Somalia the paper first examines Somali social, cultural, and historical factors which influenced US operations.

II. Somalia

Somalia is a remarkably homogeneous society where Islam is the dominate and almost exclusive religion and where the people share dialects of a common language, and the same ethnic and racial heritage. Given Somali homogeneity one would think that Somalia should enjoy a relative peaceful existence not having to content with the racial, ethnic, and religious divisions which plaque so many other countries. Yet, Somali history is replete with internal strife. The origins of Somali civil unrest can be attributed in part to the origins of its tribal (clan) heritage.⁵

In the harsh and austere Somali landscape the family became the focal point for survival. For over 2000 years family groupings roamed the wastelands with their small herds fighting to scratch out a meager existence. The forbidding environment ensured the dispersion of the population and continuous movement of family groups which in turn explains the Somali tradition of ignoring modern day geographic boundaries. Clan kinship was based on paternal blood ties. Somali tribal organizations are stratified into intricate sub-groupings. Each major clan consists of sub-clans and can be further identified by families, subfamilies, and eventually breaks down to the individual house holds. Even today in Somalia, a man who is unable to recite his lineage to the 20th generation is said to be an ignorant man. Every individual Somalia thus identifies himself as a member within a stratification of family groupings. These nomadic family groups often clashed with each other over the scarce resources creating from the very start of Somali society intense clan competition and rivalry. Thus the environment reinforced a strong clan bond that became the fundamental element of Somalia social structure.⁶

Clan solidarity was further reinforced by the symbiotic institutions of blood payments and collective ownership. Collective ownership within the tribe evolved as a means to

cope with the harsh resource poor surroundings. Communal obligation then overflowed beyond the material aspects of Somali culture to include the collective obligation of the tribe to share in the responsibility to correct wrong doings to any member of the clan. The closer the blood relationship the stronger the responsibility and more fervent the support. Clan alliances are usually transitional for the purpose of fighting one's own relations; the more close the blood tie the more readily they unite to fight. The ancient Somali saying, "myself against my bother; my brother against my cousin; my cousin and I against the outsider," epitomizes the nature of the stratified clan culture.⁷ Loyalty to family overrides all other social considerations. Families will fight in support of a relation regardless of the cause. Under these conditions it is of little wonder why the male warrior ethos was the most revered of qualities. Even today the Darood, Isaaq, Hawiye, and Dir clans which trace their heritage to the more war-like and nomadic tribes view themselves superior to the more pastoral-agricultural clans such as the Rahanwein, which many clans still refer to as a "slave tribe." In sum, Somali social structure, economy, and values ensure inter-clan violence. However, there were factors which kept clan violence in check.⁸

Although Somali social structures ensured clan violence, religion and other cultural values proved to be a mitigating factor to bloodshed. Islam and the reverence of scholarly tribal elders are unifying components of Somali society. Tribal elders and wise men presided over disputes, handed out justice, interpreted Islamic law, and educated their clans on cultural virtues. Wise men were not only revered within their own clan, but are also respected among the clans. These leaders contributed to maintaining a degree of order, kept violence under control, and prevented large clan wars which could constitute a threat to the survival of the clan. Left to its own devices Somali culture kept violence in check, however, Somalia would not be left alone.⁹

Somalia's strategic geographic position astride the crossroads of trade routes linking Africa, the middle east, and the far east with Europe ensured that it would be sought after by the major mercantile powers. Italy, France, and Britain all divided and colonized

Somalia in the late nineteenth century. All found that the Somalis were a particularly difficult race to pacify. The fiercely individualistic and independent clansmen despised colonial rule. Somalis, however, with their power dispersed amongst the various clans, were unable to form a credible opposition to the modern European armies. However, a Somali elder and religious leader of the Ogadeni clan discovered and exploited the two factors which would bind the clans together to oppose the intruders.¹⁰

Muhammad Abdulla Hassan was a religious leader who had visited and studied at Mecca. Upon his return to Somalia he used religion to unite the people in their common hatred for the outsiders. He united several of the major clans and launched a guerrilla war against the British and Italians. Several British attempts to subdue the Somalis all failed, including a 1903-1904 British expedition of some 16,000 troops. Somalis simply would not allow themselves to be subjugated by anyone one or anything. Trying to point out the uselessness of attempting to subdue the Somalis, an African colonial soldier fighting for the British told his commanding officer, "Somalis Bwana, they no good: each man his own Sultan."¹¹ By establishing strong-points deep in the interior of the country and by conducting attacks against weak enemy out posts and patrols Abdulla, or the Mad Mulla as he was known to the British, successfully waged guerrilla war against the Europeans for twenty years.¹²

In 1920 WWI was over and the British were once again able to turn their full attention to pacifying the colonies. Seeing the potential advantages of the aircraft in WWI the British were quick to employ this weapon against recalcitrant tribal leaders. The British special air unit sent to Somalia, the Z-Squadron, bombed and dispersed the Somali resistance. However, they were never able to completely destroy the rebellion or capture the Mad Mulla. Most of Abdulla's family had been killed by the British attacks; but, defiant to the end, he survived the air attacks only to die of influenza in 1921. The Mad Mulla became a legend in Somali folk lore and founded a nationalistic identity based upon a hatred of outside intervention. Somali propensity toward violence and a tradition of

opposition to outside interference are fundamental elements of Somali culture and can serve as rallying points against any unwanted intrusion.¹³

For several decades the colonial powers were able to successfully pit one tribe against another.¹⁴ Using these tactics during WWII the British were able to enlist the help of some Somali tribes to defeat the Italian forces in southern Somalia and Ethiopia. Of course, as a result of the Italy's defeat, tons of military equipment and weapons fell into the hands of the clans.¹⁵ The British now turned their attention to more pressing matters in other theaters and left a small cadre of officers to command native troops in Somalia. Now well armed, the Somali clans resumed their inter and intra-clan violence despite the best efforts of the British officers to maintain control. Tribal violence and murders were common place even among soldiers in the British formed Somali colonial units. In despair over the tribal fighting a British Captain in command of an outpost in the harsh Somali interior wrote:

"Fits of rage used to come over one after too many killings among the tribes, for one found oneself getting used to it. Yet one had to go on pretending that it mattered, while it did not matter to the Somalis. Fears slowly slips in if you are isolated enough among the warriors who hate what you represent, a threat to their joyous wars."¹⁶

After WWII, like so many other former European colonies, Somalia's borders were drawn by the victorious allies. The borders approved by the UN were inexpertly drawn and would be the source of hostilities in the years to come.¹⁷

In 1960 the Italians and British granted Somalia independence. The Somali Youth League created back during the 1940's was largely responsible for resurgence of anti-colonialism and for the creation of a nationalistic movement which formed the first Somali national democracy. Democracy did not survive long as the clans remained to be the focal point of political power and interest. Over seventy political parties existed with thousands of candidates seeking election to fill only 123 seats in the parliament. The

diffusion of the political process prevented consensus. As a result the new republic suffered from a dilution of political power which left the central government weak and ineffectual. The Somali democracy died just nine years after it was born.¹⁸

In 1969 General Mohammed Siad Barre seized power after President Aberrachid Ali Shermarke was assassinated by one of his own body guards. Naming himself as dictator, Barre imposed a government based upon Leninist scientific socialism. Eager to attain influence in this strategic area, the Soviet Union was quick to heap great quantities of arms and material on Barre. However, in 1977, when Barre announced his intentions to knock down the old Somali borders created by the colonial powers and reclaim the traditional Somali territory of the Ogaden (eastern Ethiopia), the Soviets through their support behind the Ethiopians.¹⁹

Ethiopia's eventual victory in the Ogaden war over Barre created widespread discontent among several clans. Barre brutally repressed any opposition and increasingly installed his own immediate family and clan members in the government to the exclusion of all other clans. Barre perverted the traditional clan loyalties and bonds by using them to pit one clan against another and thereby secure his own political dominance. Manipulation of clans loyalties by warlords to their own personal gain is a trend which continues in Somalia today. Barre's repressive policies only accelerated opposition. Nevertheless, the brutal Somali dictator was able to secure the military and economic support of the United States first from the Carter and then from the Reagan administration.²⁰

In light of the demise of the Shah of Iran and growing anti-US sentiment in the Middle East, the US was quick to take advantage of the Soviet's abandonment of Somalia to reassert its influence in the area.²¹ The US added to the Somali arsenals in exchange for basing and exercise rights. Barre's human rights excesses continued despite American warnings. Finally, Bush, unable to justify Barre's human rights excesses, cut off all ties

with Barre's government in 1989. Barre's immoderation in brutally repressing opposition only expedited his ultimate demise.²²

Former military, government, and clan leaders built their own armies, usually along clan lines, to oppose Barre. Three prominent groups emerged to fight Barre: the Somali Patriotic Movement, lead by Omar Jess and Muhammed Morgan of the Darood clans in the south, the United Somali Congress, lead by Muhammed Mahdi and Muhammed Farah Aideed of the Hawiye clan in Mogadishu and central Somalia, and Abdirahman Ahmad Ali Tur of the Isaaq clan who led the Somali National Movement in northern Somalia. The three groups came together in the common goal of ousting Barre. In 1991 Aideeds army defeated the remnants of Barre's forces and chased them out of Somalia. However, there would be no peace in Somalia as the leaders of the warring factions turned on each other for control of the country.²³

After Barre's defeat Mahdi announced himself as the interim president. Aideed's protests ignited a vicious war between the two leaders and their sub-clans over possession of Mogadishu. In the north the SNM declared themselves independent from the rest of Somalia forming the State of Somaliland while Jess and Mogan battled over Kismayo in the south. Civil war and resultant famine was exacerbated by drought and claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands Somalis. In an effort to avert a humanitarian disaster the UN asked the US for help.²⁴

US involvement in Somalia began in August of 1992 when President George Bush announced a US airlift of relief supplies to Somalia to provide food for the millions of starving people. On 25 August, the US military began flying more than twenty flights per day and carrying tons of relief supplies into Somalia from staging bases in nearby Kenya. However, without forces to secure the supplies and convoys, warring factions stole much of the food and medicine meant for the famine victims. Dispite the best efforts of the US and UN millions were dying and the famine was spreading. Both the Bush administration

and the UN recognized that without a secure environment the relief effort would continue to fail.²⁵

III. Operation Restore Hope

United States efforts at delivering aid to the starving and UN efforts at restoring peace in Somalia were tragically failing. In light of the growing public outcry to stop a humanitarian disaster of biblical proportion, President Bush had his staff re-examine alternatives to end the problem in Somalia. As a result, the deputies committee convened in November of 1992 and developed three courses of action. The first alternative called for increased support of existing UN efforts while the second option considered the creation of a US organized multilateral coalition without US ground force involvement. Finally, the deputies developed a course of action in which the US would organize a multinational military intervention composed primarily of US ground combat forces. During the preceding several months the Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed the use of US ground forces in Somalia; nevertheless, the Joint Staff had been preparing for this contingency. When discussing the military option with the deputies committee on November 20 Admiral David Jeremiah, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the US forces were prepared to "do the job."²⁶ All three courses of action were presented to President Bush without a recommendation on 25 November.²⁷

President Bush reviewed the options with General Colin Powell, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with other senior national security advisors. General Powell advised the President of all the risks associated with the deployment of ground forces to Somalia. Powell also expressed strong reservations about the ability of the UN to conduct a smooth transition with US forces in timely manner; a question that would later pose a significant problem for the Clinton administration. After considering all the options Bush

decided for a US led multinational effort in which US forces would play the primary role of aiding the starving in Somalia.²⁸

Careful to avoid the problems of mission creep encountered by former administrations, such as the 1982 intervention in Lebanon which ended in deaths of 241 Marines, President Bush and his chief advisors were determined to carefully craft a policy with clear objectives and end states.²⁹ As a result, the strategy for Somalia was intentionally limited in scope and duration. The strategy called for the use of US forces to establish a secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies in order to defeat starvation and famine. Bush categorically refused US involvement in any open-ended nation building operations in Somalia. The policy objectives were solely humanitarian with no consideration of disarming the various clans or monitoring a peace agreement. Furthermore, US forces would only operate in those areas in the southern third of the country most affected by the famine. Administration and Department of Defense estimates stated that US forces could establish security and begin turning over the operation to the UN as early as January; Bush envisioned no involvement of US forces in the subsequent UN peace mission. Simply put, once the relief supplies began to flow into the hands of the famine victims the US troops would return home leaving Somalia's deeper problems to the UN. With these limited objectives in mind Bush launched a global diplomatic campaign to build a coalition and thereby secure world wide support and legitimacy.³⁰

Bush requested and soon received international support for his plan. Personally calling the leaders of thirteen other countries, Bush secured the participation of all but one of the countries he solicited (United Kingdom). In addition to receiving support in the international community, the Bush plan was also the long awaited answer to the appeals by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali for increased assistance in Somalia. Boutros-Ghali embraced the US offer and the UN Security Council speedily approved Resolution 794 on 3 December. Conforming to the Bush plan, Resolution 794 set the "establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" as the objective

of the operation. The mission would also set the conditions for a "prompt transition to continued [UN] peace keeping operations." Yet Resolution 794 was significantly more than the titular UN approval Bush desired.³¹

From the very outset of the US offer to intervene militarily in Somalia, UN Secretary General Boutros-Gahli urged an expanded US military role. In late November and early December the US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and the US Ambassador to the UN Edward Perkins discussed the plan with the UN Secretary General. Boutros-Gahli argued that the coalition should disarm the Somali factions before the transition of the mission to UN forces.³² The Secretary General's views found their way into the carefully crafted mandate.

A close examination of resolution 794 reveals elements well beyond the limited objectives of Bush-Eagleburger plan. Referring to tasks akin to nation-building the resolution's mandate also included the establishment of law and order "aimed at national reconciliation." Resolution 794 was invoked under chapter seven of the UN Charter which was normally reserved for peace enforcement operations and authorized "all necessary means" to accomplish the mission. Use of chapter seven had been previously saved for longer term operations involving hostile forces in combat situations such as the Korean and Persian Gulf wars. However, the thinly veiled implications of a wider role for US forces in Somalia were not lost on the Bush administration.³³

Despite broad latitude embodied in Resolution 794 the Bush administration was quick to reject any expansion of the US military role beyond the limited humanitarian objectives originally proposed by Bush. Immediately after the passage of the resolution Bush sent the UN Secretary General a letter emphasizing the limited role of US forces in Somalia. Bush wrote:

"I want to emphasize that the mission of the coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of the starving Somali's people and allow transfer of this security function to the UN peacekeeping force."³⁴

Secretary Eagleburger reiterated the President's concerns personally to the Secretary General stating the limited nature of the US mission in Somalia and further informed him that the US would not entertain requests for the use of US combat forces in Somalia after the hand over to the UN. Bush had categorically rejected any long term nation building responsibilities in Somalia. Armed with clear and limited policy directives and an unambiguous end state, the operational level commanders were developing plans for the implementation of the mission which was designated Operation Restore Hope.³⁵

Commander of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), General Joseph P. Hoar, was responsible for planning Restore Hope. Irrespective of the broad and unprecedented use of the UN chapter seven mandate authoring "all necessary means", CENTCOM planning focused on the limited humanitarian nature of the operation as authorized by the National Command Authority. Development of a clearly defined mission statement was General Hoar's principle consideration in the early days of planning. Hoar was determined to design easily discernible and achievable objectives to ensure that military operations would not extend beyond the limited involvement that the President desired.³⁶

The two key considerations in developing the CENTCOM mission statement and plan were establishment of an unimpeded flow of humanitarian relief supplies and the rapid transition of the operation to UN control. Therefore, the CENTCOM mission ordered the securing of major sea and air ports, key installations and food distribution centers for the purpose of allowing the free flow of relief supplies. Any reference to peace operations or nation building was deliberately omitted from the plan as well as any reference to disarming the various rival factions.³⁷

Although additional missions such as disarmament of the clans and the establishment of law and order were viewed by the UN Secretary General as essential to the long term goal of a stable Somalia, General Hoar unequivocally rejected such tasks as outside the

scope and purpose of the coalition's intervention. On 11 December, two days after the first Marines landed in Somalia, Boutros-Gahli again argued for the total disarmament of all factions. In response General Hoar stated that disarmament was "a political issue, one that needs to be settled first and foremost by the Somalis." Hoar concluded that total disarmament was "neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission" of establishing a secure environment and rapid transition to UN control. It was Hoar's intent to limit disarmament and direct military action against clans or lawless individuals to situations where it directly threatened the security of relief efforts or the security of the coalition forces. Despite his efforts to prevent the unintended expansion of the mission by enumerating clear and unambiguous objectives, there remained a large degree of subjectivity in the interpretation of how much "disarming as necessary" would be enough and what was an acceptable degree of risk in terms of allowing potential threats to retain weaponry. The decisions as to what constituted direct threats and appropriate responses were left to the discretion of the commander in Somalia.³⁸

The commander of the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) was Lieutenant General Robert Johnston who was also the commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF). Johnston, who had served with the Marines in Vietnam and Lebanon, was all too familiar with the dangers of mission creep.³⁹ IMEF would also become CENTCOM's Marine Corps component in Somalia. Earlier in 1992 IMEF had participated in a CENTCOM command post exercise entailing a humanitarian relief scenario. The exercise formed the basis for the Restore Hope plan and provided timely training for IMEF staff who would form the nucleus of the UNITAF headquarters. As UNITAF commander it became Johnston's duty to further define the role of the US and other coalition units in Somalia.⁴⁰

Johnston determined that the purpose of the operation was to assist and support the humanitarian relief organizations. Specifically, military operations would establish the conditions for the relief agencies to operate unmolested. Based upon this assessment

three critical tasks evolved: secure the sea and air ports in the vicinity of Mogadishu and Kismayo to allow the supplies to safely enter Somalia, provide security for relief convoys which would bring supplies to the various distribution sites, and lastly protect the distribution centers and warehouses themselves. These tasks were clearly reflective of the CENTCOM mission and intent and established direct linkage between the National policy objectives and military operations. Once these tasks were completed transition to a UN force could begin.⁴¹

In order to determine the successful accomplishment of these tasks and further identify the tactical missions for subordinate forces, UNITAF first determined what constituted success and how to adequately measure it. A quantifiable standard would aid in determining when the mission was complete, allowing a speedy transition and thus ameliorate much of the concerns over mission creep. UNITAF gages of success were based directly upon the achievements of the relief organizations. Alternative indicators of progress focused on the military forces' ability to control an area versus control by the armed clans. However, Johnston dropped these approaches because he deemed them not consistent with the purpose of the mission. Clan or faction control of an area need not be contested unless it directly threatened the relief effort. Instead, the number of humanitarian aid convoys arriving safely at their destinations, the number of tons of relief supplies moved in a day, number of food distribution points, and complete humanitarian coverage throughout the area of operations were criteria UNITAF used to measure success. In the final phases of Restore Hope the numbers of Somali's returning to their villages as well as the ability of the International Red Cross to close food kitchens because people no longer needed them became indicators of the mission's fulfillment. Although the end states of the operations were expressed in humanitarian rather than military terms, in order to achieve these end states the humanitarian relief organizations would need the military to establish a secure environment.⁴²

In order to achieve a benign security environment necessary for the success of the humanitarian relief efforts, Johnston relied primarily on diplomatic and political efforts rather than military operations. Initially UNITAF feared that Somali militias would oppose the arrival of coalition forces.⁴³ Aideed and other clan leaders had made clear statements in the media warning against any outside military intervention in Somali affairs. To divert confrontation Johnston and Robert Oakley, President Bush's personal representative in Somalia, chose to follow a strategy of negotiations and political settlement to foster a climate of assistance rather than confrontation and to secure a benign entry for coalition forces.⁴⁴

Even before US Marines landed in Somalia on 9 December Oakley arrived in Mogadishu to negotiate with clan leaders. On 7 and 8 December Oakley met with Aideed and Mahdi in Mogadishu to obtain their pledge that the arrival of UNITAF forces would proceed unchallenged. Oakley made it clear to the clan leaders that the mission was solely humanitarian. Encouraged by the willingness of the US representative to work with the existing powers in Mogadishu and understanding the limited nature of the UNITAF mission, the clan leaders promised to cooperate. After the initial negotiations Aideed moved several hundred armed militiamen away from the airport and used his radio station and clan organizations to urge people to stay away from the dockyards and airport. The result of Oakley's efforts was the unopposed landing of US Marines at Mogadishu on 9 December. Still more negotiations with Somali clan leaders and warlords would follow forming the basis for UNITAF operations in Somalia.⁴⁵

The purpose of political efforts were to secure the cooperation of the existing powers so as to avoid armed conflict with UNITAF military forces. For example, on 11 December Johnson and Oakley met with clan leaders in Mogadishu to discuss security issues. Several threats to coalition forces still remained, such as the ever present roving militia vehicles mounted with crew served weapons which were dubbed "technicals." After talking with Johnston and Oakley the clan leaders surprised the US contingent by

excusing themselves for a private meeting which lasted for two hours. Upon their return they proudly announced a cease fire agreement and pledge to meet again to discuss an implementation policy for the voluntary cantonment of heavy weapons. Marking the first peace conference between the warring factions in over one year, the treaty significantly improved security concerns for UNITAF forces by stipulating the voluntary disarmament of irregulars and cantonment of heavy weapons. From this point forward political-diplomatic functions became the central component of UNITAF operations.⁴⁶

Employing a diplomacy first strategy UNITAF command and staff organizations exercised close coordination and political military cooperation with other US governmental agencies in Somalia. Johnson's and Oakley's staffs in Somalia interfaced informally every day to coordinate operations. Oakley held formal meetings every afternoon with representatives of the UNITAF staff to discuss possible future operations and synchronize their efforts. Back in Washington the Department of State had formed an interagency task force to coordinate responses to the crisis in Somalia, and had established a US Liaison Office in Mogadishu to connect Oakley and Johnston's efforts with other agencies. This focus on political military operations extended down to the lowest tactical levels.⁴⁷

Tactical actions, similar to those at the operational level, relied on the close coordination and cooperation with political diplomatic efforts to ensure compliance of the clans and prevent armed conflict between UNITAF elements and the Somali militias. To accomplish this Oakley would precede military forces into the Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS).⁴⁸ He typically informed the elders and warlords of the impending arrival of UNITAF elements. Oakley assured them that UNITAF's mission was solely humanitarian and asked for their cooperation and non-violence. Complementing Oakley's information campaign, psychological operations preceded the arrival of forces into the humanitarian relief sector. Psychological operations elements dropped leaflets, conducted radio broadcasts, and used air and ground based public address systems to psychologically

prepare the population for the arriving troops.⁴⁹ Special Forces teams also often arrived in advance of the main units. These small teams who had unique language and area training had little difficulty in demonstrating to the population that the coalition forces were indeed coming to help rather than conquer.⁵⁰ Together political negotiations, psychological operations, and special forces established the conditions for successful security operations. After these preparations were complete the larger units of the combat forces would enter the area and secure the humanitarian relief warehouses, distribution points, and begin escorting relief convoys. In sum, the wide successes enjoyed by UNITAF in achieving a secure environment was largely contingent upon diplomatic success.⁵¹

A large and credible coalition force capable of imposing (if necessary) a secure environment through overwhelming fire power leveraged Oakley's diplomatic negotiations. United States troop strength at its peak numbered approximately twenty-five thousand soldiers and marines which was composed largely of the combat forces of the IMEF and 10th Infantry Division. UNITAF was also composed of nine thousand other foreign troops. Operations were confined to the southern third of the country and further focused on only the areas most in need of relief or those areas which were needed for transportation hubs. This allowed commanders a greater degree of concentration than they would have otherwise enjoyed if required to secure the entire country. With a large technologically advanced force and a relatively modest area of operation, UNITAF had the capability to quickly concentrate overwhelming force against any threat. Oakley and Johnson were quick to point out this fact when negotiating with Somali war lords. When confronted with an uncooperative clan leader Oakley would point out the US military's capability displayed in the recent Gulf War and emphasized the strong and proficient forces present in Somalia. Warlords, in no hurry to suffer an embarrassing defeat or lose the confidence of their people, could often be pressured into cooperating with UNITAF forces.⁵²

The Somalis' inclination to cooperate was reinforced by two key understandings. Warlords recognized that UNITAF would not stay in Somalia for very long. They also discerned that UNITAF's humanitarian mission posed no significant threat to their political or military survival. Despite the success of Johnston's and Oakley's strategy the diplomatic initiatives produced some unintended outcomes.

The success of the diplomatic initiatives produced numerous and varied disarmament agreements throughout the country. Agreements ranged from total voluntary disarmament in some villages to limited disarmament and cantonment of heavy weapons in other areas.⁵³ Originally the idea of pursuing political settlements in lieu of direct military action was intended to facilitate establishing a secure environment, but in many cases these agreements required UNITAF forces to supervise, implement, and enforce. UNITAF was the only credible and neutral force in the country capable of taking on the mission. In the case of the 11 December Aideed-Mahadi agreement in Mogadishu, for example, UNITAF had the obligation to monitor the cantonment of heavy weapons in the mutually agreed upon locations. In mid January the Addis Ababa peace talks resulted in disarmament agreements between 16 different factions.⁵⁴ Eager to seek political settlement over military solutions UNITAF now added several military tasks to their operations including responsibility to respond to violations of the various disarmament agreements.

Little guidance was forthcoming from the UNITAF headquarters to the subordinate units on exactly what "provide security entailed," and on exactly how much disarmament they should pursue.⁵⁵ Decisions on the amount of disarmament as well as the methods were left to the discretion of the commanders of the fourteen various humanitarian relief sectors created by UNITAF.⁵⁶ Tactical units developed missions and plans and would submit them to UNITAF for guidance and approval. This bottom up planning process was used by the 10th Division to ensure their tactical operations did not expand beyond the intent of the UNITAF commander.⁵⁷ The 10th Mountain Division formulated criteria

for establishing security within their areas of operations which were commonly referred to among the soldiers in the division as the "four no's": no visible weapons, no bandits, no "technicals," and no Somali checkpoints.⁵⁸ Realizing that total disarmament was virtually impossible the 10th Division sought to limit disarmament to the areas under their immediate control using the "four no's" as a guide. Nonetheless tactical units grappled with the problem of enforcing violations of disarmament agreements.

Responses to violations of the disarmament agreements changed depending on several factors such as the amount and type of weapons in question and the estimated threat they posed to continued humanitarian operations. Responses therefore varied dramatically from mere warnings and simple searches for contraband weapons to infantry battalion raids on large unauthorized weapons caches. Because most disarmament was voluntary and was based on Somali peace agreements, such as the January Addis Adda conference, the majority of operations went unopposed. Aideed and Mahdi both moved sizable amounts of heavy weapons into cantonment sites by the end of January. However, there were major military operations waged against recalcitrant faction leaders. On 25 January the 10th Division conducted air and ground attacks against Morgan's faction in the vicinity of Kismayo destroying some thirty five vehicles.⁵⁹ The attacks were launched after negotiations failed and Morgan refused to move the weapons into the agreed upon area.⁶⁰ Large seizures of weapons took place in virtually all the sectors.⁶¹ Nevertheless, large scale combat operations designed to seize weapons were rare. Units deliberately sought to minimize the use of force and to limit disarmament.

Task Force Kismayo (elements of the 10th Division) opened dialogue with Jess and Morgan militias and eventually after several weeks of talks disarmament began on both sides. These talks also helped to open dialogue with a third faction. The 10th Division noted that most incidents of civil unrest could be resolved through talks with local elders. Tactical units actively engaged in direct negotiations with clan elders and warring factions so as to minimize violence and entice Somalis to disarm voluntarily. In keeping with the

humanitarian intent of the operation tactical commanders focused on political and diplomatic solutions using force only as a last resort.⁶²

In view of the limited nature of the disarmament conducted by UNITAF it is more accurate to describe these tasks in terms of arms control.⁶³ Military operations were never intended to totally disarm the population.⁶⁴ Rather tactical commanders focused on areas in their immediate control which could directly impact on the humanitarian relief mission. Disarmament agreements such as the January and March Addis Ababa conferences enabled UNITAF forces to retain the appearance of neutrality and legitimacy when enforcing arms control agreements. Avoiding forcible disarmament of the clans and opting for negotiations whenever possible also added to the appearance of neutrality and minimized direct confrontation with the factions. Although limited disarmament unexpectedly expanded the military operations beyond the original letter of the UNITAF mission they were directly linked to establishing the secure environment. As time passed still more military tasks surfaced.

As operations expanded into the interior of the country additional and unexpected military tasks emerged. The final phases of UNITAF operations would extend the reach of humanitarian aid into the remote interior of Somalia. Phase III of UNITAF's plan envisioned the completion of the humanitarian effort paving the way for the fourth and final phase, transition to UN control.⁶⁵ Delivery of relief into the interior of the country was necessary to accomplish the mission. Introducing humanitarian aid to the interior would produce the collateral benefit of stemming the flow of refugees into the already overly crowded larger cities. Overcrowding tended to exacerbate violent crime, clan rivalries, health problems, and overtax the capabilities of the relief agencies. However, during the preceding years of civil war and internal strife the infrastructure of the country had either deteriorated or been deliberately destroyed thus presenting an obstacle to UNITAF operations. In addition, many of the outlying areas where the suffering was deemed critical were inaccessible by the predominately road bound humanitarian

organizations.⁶⁶ As a result UNITAF military engineers found themselves employed in countless projects rebuilding and in some case actually creating Somalia's transportation infrastructure. Elements such as the 36th Engineer Group constructed over 1100 kilometers of road, improved countless miles of the existing roads, built and repaired numerous bridges, removed mines, and expanded and reinforced surfaces of existing airfields.⁶⁷

The use of Army engineers was seen by many as an example mission creep.⁶⁸ However, the improvement of infrastructure was directly coupled to the fundamental factor which guided all UNITAF operations: a rapid transition to UN control. For example, engineer projects along the major road connecting Mogadishu with Kismayo to the south reduced convoy travel time from twenty-six to twelve hours.⁶⁹ The number of convoys increased with the expansion and repair of the road network thereby speeding up the pace of the humanitarian operation and facilitating the return of refugees to their homes and fields. The upgrading of airfield surfaces and of ramp space increased the flow of supplies into theater again adding to the speed of the relief effort. The engineer projects were clearly linked to the UNITAF end states and to the ultimate rapid accomplishment of the mission desired by the National Command Authority. The engineer efforts, like limited disarmament operations, advanced the rapid accomplishment of the UNITAF mission.

On 4 February 1993, less than two months from the first US marine landing on Somali shores, UNITAF declared that a secure environment had been established and they were ready to begin the transition to UN control.⁷⁰ UNITAF was moving more than 9000 metric tons of supplies a month, seventy convoys were conducted of which only one came under hostile fire, and virtually no weapons were visible in the streets of Mogadishu.⁷¹ Starvation had been stopped. The UN, however, was not ready to assume control. It was not until the 4th of May that the UN would finally agree to accept control in Somalia.⁷²

It was during this interim three month period from 3 February to 4 May that UNITAF experienced its greatest challenges in preventing mission creep. With the humanitarian mission largely completed in February, units began to consolidate and expand security operations and engage in tasks akin to nation building. Units required to stay in Somalia well past mission accomplishment focused on their own protection and consequently expanded security operations. For example, on 28 February forces in Kismayo increased disarmament operations and in Mogadishu increases in random violence in the vicinity of the airport were met with house to house searches for weapons by US Marines.⁷³ The 10th Division after action review noted that as the operation continued "a phenomenon which we called mission creep developed."⁷⁴

Negotiations with clan leaders became a daily occurrence.⁷⁵ Units found themselves assisting in the establishment of local governments and police forces.⁷⁶ Involvement in establishing local governments often jeopardized UNITAF's neutrality as clans increasingly charged UNITAF with inequity. Unsatisfied with the new security arrangements in Kismayo Jess' forces renewed fighting with Morgan's militia on 16 March. Jess believed the US sponsored negotiations were unfair and accused the US of siding with Morgan.

In late March, with the Bush administration now gone, Boutros-Gahli renewed his efforts to expand the scope of the UNITAF mission to include a complete disarmament of the factions and an enlargement of its area of operation into the central and northern portions of the country. Like the Bush administration, the Clinton administration initially refused this role. Undaunted by this rebuff, the UN did not refrain from seeking other uses for UNITAF. In April a UN sponsored refugee repatriation program threatened to create new security issues that UNITAF would be forced to address. Although the operation was postponed due to monsoons, UNITAF's after action review pointed out that such operations represented the increase in mission creep as the operation wore on.⁷⁷

The success of UNITAF in establishing a secure environment and ending starvation resulted from the clear limits placed the operation and from the close communication

between military, political, and Somali leaders at all levels. The clearly articulated humanitarian objectives stated by the NCA were well defined and achievable. These goals were directly reflected in the CENTCOM and UNITAF commander's mission statements and intents. Execution of the operation was based on close coordination between the political and military elements. The clearly defined and unchanging objective and purpose of Operation Restore Hope helped prevent mission creep.

Operation Restore Hope's limited humanitarian role was accepted by the Somali people and more importantly by the existing faction leaders thereby paving the way for cooperation. Restore Hope, due to its humanitarian nature, posed no political or military threat to the existing factional powers as long as they cooperated. The factions were able to retain weapons deemed critical to their continued survival as long as they remained hidden or in authorized locations. Major confrontation was thus avoided allowing UNITAF to proceed toward their humanitarian aims. Although disarmament tasks had the potential to expand tactical operations beyond Restore Hope's stated objectives several factors prevented this.

Disarmament operations were limited both geographically and politically. Both General Hoar and Johnston were quick to point out that total disarmament was never contemplated or attempted. Political and diplomatic agreements preceded virtually all disarmament operations and weapons seizures were limited to only those areas necessary for the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and for force protection. Although the disarmament evolved beyond the scope originally anticipated the majority of disarmament was directly linked to establishing a secure environment and was facilitated by Somali agreements. These factors allowed UNITAF to maintain the impartiality and legitimacy necessary for securing the cooperation of the Somali people which in turn allowed UNITAF to rapidly establish a secure environment.⁷⁸

The delay in transition to a UN peacekeeping force after the accomplishment of UNITAF's mission was the only factor which significantly threatened to expand UNITAF's

role beyond the stated objective of Restore Hope. Time became the one true enemy of UNITAF. Commanders in Somalia, recognizing that evolution of the tactical operations toward nation building threatened their legitimacy and neutrality, worked diligently to keep their operations focused on humanitarian operations. While some mission creep occurred the basic mission statement and objectives were consistently respected in all operations in Somalia.⁷⁹ With the mission of establishing a secure environment accomplished and starvation arrested, the UN assumed its wider nation building mission.

IV. A Bridge Too Far ?

United Nations Operations in Somalia II

Acting under the authority granted by United Nations Security Council Resolution 814, the UN assumed control of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia on 4 May 1993. The UN mandate won broad support, especially from the US who was anxious to get out of Somalia. However, the UN mission was dramatically different from that of its predecessor, UNITAF. Madeleine Albright, the US Ambassador to the UN, describing the objectives set forth in 814 and the future UN role in Somalia, stated:

"with this resolution, we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud functioning and viable member of the community of nations."⁸⁰

Where UNITAF's mission had been purposefully limited in scope and duration the UN mission was broad and ambitious.⁸¹

The UN operation was designated United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Expanding on UNITAF's initial success UNOSOM's mandate was to extend operations into the entire country including the northern "Somaliland" which had declared itself independent from the rest of the country.⁸² Where UNITAF's end states

were focused on the measured success of humanitarian operation, UNOSOM's task was broader and more difficult to measure.⁸³ Tasked with "rehabilitating political institutions," and "promoting national reconciliation," the mandate provided no methods or indications as to how these goals were to be achieved.⁸⁴ With the operations focusing on solving the underlying political, social, and economic problems of Somalia, the resolution and mandate were of little use to military commanders seeking clear and militarily attainable objectives. What the mandate did reveal, however, was that disarmament was to be an important goal.

Despite the UN inability to convince either the Bush or Clinton administrations to take on the role of totally disarming Somalia, disarmament became a key aspect of UNOSOM's mandate. Reflecting the Secretary General's continued determination to disarm Somalia, Resolution 814 asserted "the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective program for disarming all Somali parties."⁸⁵ The resolution asserted that clan violence was the primary threat to national reconciliation and the rebuilding of the country, and therefore emphasized the "crucial importance of disarmament."⁸⁶

The new UN mandate threatened some of the warlords not only militarily, but also politically. Specifically, not only did Resolution 814 call for the disarmament of all the clans and factions, but also it mandated the establishment of a Somali national democratic form of government. Directing the "establishment of representative democratic institutions," Resolution 814's ultimate political goal was to organize and monitor "free and fair elections."⁸⁷ The resolution was based upon the presumption that Somalis wanted a representative democracy. It also presumed that the warlords would allow the UN to impose a form of government on them regardless of the type; given their history of violent opposition to any outside interference it seemed unlikely that they would accept such an imposition. UNOSOM experienced difficulties imposing their broad objectives from the start.

During the transition to UNOSOM II control in March and April 1993 the UN had difficulty building a coalition. On the day that the UNOSOM staff took over operations in Mogadishu it was significantly under strength, consisting of only approximately one-fourth of its authorized level of manning.⁸⁸ Nations who had pledged to send troops were slow in following up on their promises. Although UNOSOM's authorized strength was 28,000, by May barely 21,000 troops had arrived.⁸⁹ Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN Secretary General's representative in Somalia, complained that the UN was not adequately prepared to assume its role, citing the lack of prepared forces.⁹⁰ It became clear to the Clinton administration that some countries were not willing to become involved without a demonstrated US commitment to the UN effort; a commitment which could only be shown through forces on the ground.⁹¹

Eager to demonstrate their policy of "assertive multilateralism" the Clinton administration wanted the UN mission to succeed.⁹² To show US support for the UN and to encourage other nations to speedily send the forces which they had pledged, Clinton decided to allow approximately 1200 combat troops to remain in Somalia. Clinton's decision was a reversal of Bush's categorical refusal to allow a US presence in Somalia beyond the UNITAF mission, and thus represented a dramatic shift in US policy. Still unwilling to take on direct responsibility for the UN nation building mission, but at the same time wanting it to succeed, Clinton and Secretary of defense Les Aspin authorized the use of US troops in a limited role.

Initially the role of US combat forces in Somalia in support of UNOSOM II was to provide a quick reaction force (QRF) in order to respond to emergencies.⁹³ The US QRF consisted of a brigade task force from the 10th Division composed of the 1st Brigade Headquarters, an infantry battalion, an aviation battalion, and support elements.⁹⁴ Specifically, the task of the QRF as stated in the UNOSOM II operational plan was to "respond to hostile threats and attacks which exceed UNOSOM II capabilities" and "conduct operations beyond the capabilities of UNOSOM II."⁹⁵ The plan made no

mention of exactly what type of missions "exceeded the capabilities" of UN forces. The QRF mission, like the UNOSOM mandate, was broad and ambiguous. Commitment criteria and employment of the QRF was left almost entirely to the US commander in Somalia.⁹⁶

To avoid the appearance that US troops were under UN command, the US task force was under the operational control (OPCON) of the CENTCOM commander General Hoar. In Somalia, however, the QRF received their orders from Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, who was authorized tactical control (TACON) of all US forces. Montgomery was not only commander of US forces in Somalia, but the UNOSOM II deputy commander as well. He was in the unique position of being in both the US and UN command structure simultaneously. It was left to his judgment to determine what tasks were "beyond the capability of UNOSOM II" and to then assign tactical missions for the QRF in Somalia.⁹⁷

It became readily apparent to Montgomery that the military capability of UN forces were inadequate for their tasks. Not only was the UNOSOM force significantly smaller than its predecessor (UNITAF), but also its mission was much larger. By mid-August UNOSOM still numbered only approximately 20,000 troops, some 7000 less than authorized and 15,000 less than UNITAF.⁹⁸ Yet, the UNOSOM force was directed to expand into the entire country, where UNITAF operations were confined to the southern third of Somalia.⁹⁹ In addition to the increase in the area of operation, the UNOSOM mission expanded the scope of disarmament operations, a task which General Hoar had earlier stated was beyond the capabilities of the much larger UNITAF force.¹⁰⁰ It became readily apparent from the expanded use of the QRF in UN operations that Montgomery judged virtually all military operations to be "beyond the capabilities" of UN forces.

Initially, the QRF focused its planning on contingencies to reinforce, in case of an emergency, the various humanitarian sectors in Somalia with priority on Mogadishu and Kismayo.¹⁰¹ Montgomery, however, availing himself to the large discretionary powers

given him by the President, tasked the QRF to conduct weapons seizures, cordons and searches, convoy escorts, raids, and attacks primarily in the vicinity of Mogadishu.¹⁰² In testimony before Congress, Montgomery later explained that often the US units were the only forces in Somalia readily available, trained, and equipped to conduct combat operations.¹⁰³ In reality, the QRF's mission thus became indistinguishable from that of UNOSOM's. The expansion of the QRF beyond its originally intended emergency reaction force mission was not lost on the soldiers and leaders of the 1st Brigade 10th Division.

The QRF leaders recognized that the operations they were performing had nothing to do with the originally stated purpose of their mission. The QRF's role expanded to protecting US and UN forces and to conducting operations designed to achieve the UN's disarmament objectives.¹⁰⁴ Perplexed at the missions they were called upon to perform, the 1st battalion 22nd Infantry after action report commented that they had "executed a variety of missions such as routine cordon and searches that had nothing to do with the TF's overall mission."¹⁰⁵ Describing the decoupling of their operations from their initial objectives the after action report also noted, "there did not appear to be a clear cut objective," and "leaders and soldiers found it very difficult to determine what constituted success."¹⁰⁶ Soldiers complained that their efforts were not accomplishing anything and were a waste of time.¹⁰⁷ QRF operations degenerated into a series of cordon and searches with no discernible connection with the original US mission.¹⁰⁸

The cause of this confusion and lack of clear military objectives stemmed from a conflicting US military policy. Clinton administration policy required US force levels to remain small while simultaneously preventing the UN mission in Somalia from failing.¹⁰⁹ General Hoar and General Montgomery, recognizing that "the allies couldn't be depended upon," increased the military role of the QRF to accomplish the UN's mission.¹¹⁰ Major General Sheehan, reflecting on the contradictory policy, remarked, "our choice was to allow the mission to fail or to take up the job."¹¹¹ Hoar therefore authorized the major

disarmament operations conducted by the QRF. He later lamented, "we had a continuing problem that grew over time, to use the QRF for force protection."¹¹²

The policy also lacked the same degree of close political/military cooperation which had existed during Restore Hope. Unlike operation Restore Hope senior military commanders were in direct opposition to involvement of US forces in the UNOSOM II mission. General Powell was never consulted over the implications of UN Resolution 814. Like Hoar, Powell opposed the disarmament of the factions and later criticized the UN plan: "I always said that disarming the factions was stupid."¹¹³ The UN commander of UNOSOM II, Lieutenant General Cevik Bir of Turkey, was equally as critical of UN guidance complaining that the political directions he received were insufficient to formulate a satisfactory military plan, and that there was inadequate time to fully plan and prepare the UN operation.¹¹⁴ The lack of political/military coordination at the national and strategic levels had a devastating effect on operations in Somalia.

Although UNITAF had benefited from the close cooperation between military and political operations, UNOSOM II and the US QRF enjoyed no such advantages. Ambassador Oakley, the key to successful negotiations during Restore Hope and a Bush appointee, was replaced by the Clinton administration in March. UN political and diplomatic initiatives virtually ceased immediately following Oakley's departure and the transition to UNOSOM II.¹¹⁵ Initial negotiations sponsored by the UN broke down over issues involving disarmament and the composition of the new Somali government.¹¹⁶ Oakley had been largely successful due to his willingness to accommodate existing powers. The UN during UNOSOM II, however, sought to replace the existing powers in Somalia and strip power away from the warlords.¹¹⁷ As a result several factions, most noticeably Aideed's, refused to negotiate with the UN at a 22 May conference.¹¹⁸ Seeking to impose a new order on Somalia, the UN represented a significant threat to some of the factions political and military autonomy.

Aideed responded to this threat by moving militiamen and weapons back into Mogadishu and by removing weapons from authorized cantonment sites fearing their destruction.¹¹⁹ Aideed also used his radio station to start a psychological operations campaign of his own to build popular support against the US and UN.¹²⁰ Finally, in early June Aideed resolved to negotiate his own peace settlement with 200 representatives of other clans outside the UN framework. The Aideed brokered peace agreement reflected a desire for peace and national unity, albeit to his own personal benefit.¹²¹ Admiral Howe and the UN, however, declared the agreement illegitimate.¹²² Violence and hostilities against UN troops immediately erupted in the streets of Mogadishu following the UN announcement. UNOSOM escalated military operations in Mogadishu to include a US attack on Aideed's radio broadcasting antenna.¹²³ Ironically, the very device that Aideed had used just six months earlier to urge cooperation and secure the unopposed entry of UNITAF forces now became a target for destruction by US forces. Tragically for both the US and the UN, the irony did not go unnoticed or unanswered by Aideed or the Somali people.

Nothing unifies Somalis as well as an outside invader, and now UN forces in Somalia unwittingly became just that. With the failure of diplomatic efforts, Boutros Gahli, Howe, and Montgomery all tried to achieve with purely military means what they were unable to accomplish diplomatically. Following the raids on the radio station Gahli proclaimed that the attack should be seen as a message of UN commitment to the disarmament policy.¹²⁴ Gahli proclaimed that if the factions would not disarm voluntarily they would be forced to disarm, and further boasted that once the factions were disarmed UNOSOM would undertake a sector by sector disarmament of Mogadishu.¹²⁵

In Aideed's view the UN's stated objectives and the escalation of military operations was tantamount to a declaration of war. Aideed, who's name when literally translated means: "man who tolerates no insult," made this view perfectly clear to the UN.¹²⁶ When UNOSOM announced they would inspect Aideed's weapon cantonment sites on the 5th of

June, Aideed, through a close associate, informed the UNOSOM staff that if the inspection was conducted "it would lead to war."¹²⁷

On the 5th of June the Pakistani battalion marched off to inspect the weapons storage sites. After discovering that many of the heavy weapons had been moved out of the site the Pakistanis started back to their barracks. On the way they were ambushed by several hundred of Aideed's militiamen. In the melee that ensued 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed. The US QRF had to be committed to help rescue their beleaguered allies resulting in several US soldiers being wounded. Outraged at the massacre, the UN, with the US's full endorsement, quickly ratified UN Security Council resolution 837.¹²⁸

Resolution 837 mandated the apprehension of those responsible for the 5 June ambush and reaffirmed the disarmament and nation building role of UNOSOM II.¹²⁹ Although Aideed's name was not specifically mentioned in the resolution it did name the SNA (which Aideed commanded) as the responsible party. Furthermore, Gahli specifically named Aideed as the perpetrator of the ambush in his report to the security council.¹³⁰ Articulating the administration's full support of the new mandate, Madeleine Albright branded Aideed a thug.¹³¹ Quickly implementing the new mandate US and UN troops launched a series of attacks against Aideed enclaves immediately following the 5 June ambush.¹³² Admiral Howe ended any speculation over the true target of UN attacks when he offered a 25,000 dollar reward for Aideed's capture.¹³³ Aideed's militia in turn escalated its use of violence by increasing attacks against both US and UN forces.¹³⁴

While military actions in Somalia escalated throughout June and July, Clinton's political and military advisors considered Admiral Howe's request for US special operations forces to capture Aideed. Several senior US military leaders strongly opposed the use of US forces to capture Aideed. General Hoar, hearing that Washington was getting increased pressure from the UN to deploy special operations forces to Somalia, flew to the Pentagon on 30 June. Hoar conferred with Powell, Aspin, Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner, and other NSC advisors. In characteristically unambiguous terms

Hoar told them "that it was a bad thing to do." Hoar bluntly stated that an operation of this type and in this particular environment was "high risk" and had only a "25 % chance of success." General Powell agreed with Hoar and expressed his views in even stronger terms although he estimated that the mission had a 50% chance of success.¹³⁵

General Montgomery, with the unfortunate responsibility of being both a UN and US military leader in Somalia, sided with the UN and agreed with the mission to capture Aideed and endorsed Howe's request for special forces. Other principle proponents of the UN plan in addition to Montgomery and Howe included Wisner, Clinton advisor Anthony Lake, Ambassador Robert Gosende, Ambassador David Shinn, and Aspin. In the end those in favor of using US special forces had more power, influence, and numbers than Hoar and Powell. The administration approved Howe's request.¹³⁶ However, Powell and Hoar were not alone in their dissenting views on the escalating course of operations in Somalia.

Other contingents of UNOSOM II were unwilling subordinate their own national interest to the interests of the UN. As military operations against Aideed grew the Italian contingent commander refused to participate. Outraged, the UN called for his relief. However, the Italian commander was operating under the guidance of his national command authority who not only refused to replace him but also refused to order Italian forces to take part in the Aideed man hunt. Consequently the Italian contingent was moved out of Mogadishu to a less volatile sector of Somalia. Due to their previous experiences in Somalia, the Italians had a better understanding of Somali society than most of the parties involved and thus rejected the UN's uncompromising military approach.¹³⁷

Failing to realize the wisdom of the Italians, the US yet again changed it's policy and the role of US forces in Somalia. Montgomery accurately describing the mission's transformation by stating, "the mission changed to a manhunt for Aideed."¹³⁸ Resolution 837 had dramatically changed yet again the roles of both the US and UN forces.

Unlike the Bush administration's dogged refusal to expand UNITAF's mission, Clinton's policy goals in Somalia slowly evolved to mirror those of the UN. Clinton, responding to questions from reporters on 16 June, stated that the US objective in Somalia was "to make sure that the United Nations can fulfill its mission and continue to work with the Somalis toward nation building."¹³⁹ In an unequivocal declaration that the US was now taking on the UN mission in Somalia, Aspin in an August speech stated that the US was staying in Somalia to help rebuild the nation and added "President Clinton has given us clear direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia."¹⁴⁰ Additionally, Aspin enumerated these three tasks that US forces had to accomplish before returning home: securing stability in Mogadishu, disarmament of the factions, and establishment of police forces.¹⁴¹ Highlighting the comparative closeness between the UN and US goals a United Nations spokesman commenting after Aspin's speech remarked, "the UN and the Secretary of Defense see pretty much eye to eye."¹⁴² The Clinton administration had now fully committed the US to the accomplishment of the UN nation building mission and to the hunt for Aideed.

To accomplish this mission the QRF would continue its attacks to destroy or seize weapons in Mogadishu and the US would deploy a special operations task force to capture Aideed. Task Force Ranger, a 440 man special operations task force under the command of Major General William F. Garrison, deployed to Mogadishu on 24 August. Task Force Ranger consisted of soldiers from the 3rd Ranger Battalion, men from Special Forces Operation Detachment Delta, and elements of the 1st Battalion 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. These elite organizations were specially trained in the skills necessary to capture Aideed. However, Aideed was not an unsuspecting target.¹⁴³

Task Force Ranger would enjoy no element of strategic surprise. The deployment of special forces to Somalia and the unique capabilities of the units involved were well documented in the media.¹⁴⁴ Given Gahli's exhortations demanding Aideed's arrest and Howe's rash act of placing a price on Aideed's head, Aideed was able to easily discern

the mission of the arriving US troops. Task Force Ranger's target wisely melted away into the heart of SNA territory in southern Mogadishu into which few UNOSOM units now ventured.

The lack of discretion on the part of the UN command in announcing their intent to capture Aideed was unfortunate. Prior to the UN public demands for his capture Aideed could still be seen on the open streets of Mogadishu presenting an easier target for Task Force Ranger. Now, however, the mission was made more difficult. In order to conduct an operation Task Force Ranger first had to have actionable intelligence on Aideed's location and then operate within his strongholds.¹⁴⁵ As a result TF Ranger conducted only seven missions from August 24 to 3 October, all of which failed in capturing Aideed although they did succeed in capturing several of his key subordinates.¹⁴⁶

With each passing mission the likelihood of a successful outcome dwindled. Although TF Ranger varied their tactics to retain as much tactical surprise as possible their leaders felt that the risks of mission failure were increasing as Somalis could determine their methods and take action against them.¹⁴⁷ The one unchanging component in TF Ranger operations was the employment of aircraft. Helicopters were used to insert or extract forces and as weapons platforms for supportive fire. Ground convoys were also often used in conjunction with air assaults in an effort to vary tactics.

The Somalis were quick to identify this pattern and began to target US aircraft. The first engagement of a US aircraft by Somalis occurred on the 25 August when an rocket propelled grenade (RPG) was fired at a helicopter. One month later a second helicopter was engaged by an RPG and shot down killing three of its crew members.¹⁴⁸ Undeterred, TF Ranger continued its mission. The QRF was also exposed to increasing dangers.

The QRF came under intensifying fire in Mogadishu as they took on the more aggressive Clinton policy. In July and August the QRF conducted numerous raids on the houses of known Aideed supporters and subordinates and on suspected weapons storage

sites, and also increased the random cordon and searches operations. The SNA escalated in kind, using RPGs to beat back a US weapons seizure operation on 8 September.¹⁴⁹ The US compound at the airport came under indiscriminate mortar fire beginning in July and in August US forces fell victim to command detonated mines on two occasions. On 22 August a single mortar attack wounded six US troops and damaged several aircraft.¹⁵⁰ By September UNOSOM II had suffered over sixty soldiers killed in action.¹⁵¹ As a result of escalated fighting Montgomery informally requested armored forces to increase protection for US troops. On September 9th Montgomery made the request formal after a US engineer unit was ambushed while in the process of clearing a road block in Mogadishu. In his request Montgomery warned that "US forces were at risk without it [armor]."¹⁵²

Both Hoar and Powell forwarded the request for armor with their strong endorsements along with that of the Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan. Supporting Montgomery's request Hoar stated, "my concern was to do what was required - the mission was already creeping."¹⁵³ Recognizing that the administration was unlikely to grant the request given Clinton's policy of keeping a small US profile, Hoar commented "there is no stomach in DC for new forces."¹⁵⁴ Aspin, after consulting with Powell, disapproved Montgomery's request stating only that he did not want to increase the US presence in Somalia. Later in the week Powell raised the issue at the White House arguing that the US should either reinforce the forces in Somalia or change its policies. The week before his retirement on 24 September Powell again urged President Clinton to review the Somalia policy. Unbeknownst to Powell and other senior military leaders the Clinton administration was yet again changing its policy on Somalia.¹⁵⁵ Clinton's policy thus served to increase the role and risks to US forces while simultaneously denying commanders the tools necessary to accomplish the mission.¹⁵⁶

While US military operations in Somalia escalated and the risks to US troops increased with each passing day, the Clinton administration was changing its policies

toward a political solution with Aideed, rather than military one. Under Secretary of Defense Wisner noted that the request for armor came at a time when the administration was trying to shift the UN's focus to a political solution.¹⁵⁷ Secretary of State Warren Christopher along with Albright were urging the UN to reinvigorate a political solution.¹⁵⁸ In late September, Clinton met with Boutros-Gahli to convince him to abandon the hunt for Aideed and re-energize a political solution, but Gahli refused.¹⁵⁹ Oakley's replacement, Gosende, although conducting no fruitful direct negotiations with the Somali warlords (leaving the job to the UN) urged Clinton to change US policy from a military to political settlement, but Clinton was not yet ready to abandon the UN.¹⁶⁰ Aspin, defending US- Somalia policy before Congress later testified that beginning in August the US was following a "two track policy:" pressuring the Somalis militarily in hopes of coercing a negotiated settlement with the SNA.¹⁶¹

In theory a two tracked policy may have worked, but in reality only the military track was being followed. Neither the US nor the UN had engaged in any political dialogue with Aideed since May. UN and US diplomats rarely ventured outside their compounds in Mogadishu and Gahli argued that no political process was possible until Aideed had been disarmed and captured.¹⁶² Therefore military operations against the SNA and the hunt for Aideed went on unabated resulting in a US military disaster.

On 3 October TF Ranger conducted a daylight raid to capture Aideed. Aideed's militia, now aware of US tactics, quickly mobilized to meet the threat. Recognizing the vulnerability of US aircraft and the tested effectiveness of the RPG, the militiamen successfully targeted TF Ranger helicopters. After the successful insertion of the TF Ranger's assault element, a ground convoy lead by LTC Danny Mcknight raced to the target sight to extract the assault element along with their prisoners (Aideed not among them). It was at this time that the first of two US helicopters were shot down crashing in the streets of Mogadishu. A third helicopter was also hit but was able to limp back to the airfield. The Rangers of the assault team immediately went to the aid of the first downed

aircraft forming a protective perimeter around it. Somalis massed around the US perimeter placing a deadly and continuous fire on the Americans. Mcknight and his convoy, battered by fire, tried unsuccessfully to reach the downed aircraft and were finally ordered by Garrison to return to the airfield with his wounded and the SNA captives. At this time the second helicopter was shot down. Now with elements of TF Ranger unable to disengage and yet another aircraft shot down somewhere in Mogadishu Montgomery had to commit the QRF.¹⁶³

The QRF was alerted to reinforce and extract the encircled Rangers and the crew of the second downed aircraft. Proceeding in trucks from the airport toward the crash sites elements of the 2nd Battalion 14th Infantry, due to their lack of armored protection, were repulsed by the withering Somali fire. In the growing darkness the QRF tried a second rescue attempt. This time the Pakistani's and Malaysians volunteered to provide the tanks and armored personnel carriers to support the effort. After several hours of fighting the column, minus the Pakistani tanks who stopped short of their objective, broke through to the beleaguered US forces at approximately 2 am on 4 October. Relieving US forces arrived at the second crash site only to find that no Americans were left alive and there was no trace of the one crew member who had been taken prisoner by the SNA. The operation had cost the lives of nineteen American soldiers and wounded some eighty-four others. Aideed released his one US prisoner later in the month after proudly showing him off to the world press. As a result of the TF Ranger tragedy the Clinton administration again changed its policy.¹⁶⁴

After the 3 October raid Clinton retreated from his earlier military commitment to the UN nation building mission, and announced the complete withdrawal of US forces.¹⁶⁵ Clinton quickly put a hold on all US military operations in Somalia including disarmament missions and the search for Aideed. Following the disaster Clinton also announced the immediate deployment of armored forces to Mogadishu to allow for the safe withdrawal of US forces.¹⁶⁶ Until their eventual withdrawal US forces would be restricted to their

own protection in the immediate vicinity of their compounds.¹⁶⁷ Clinton, now turning his policy toward a political settlement, re-appointed Oakley to his former post as special envoy to Somalia to negotiate a unilateral peace with Aideed. Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the Clinton policy reversal perhaps occurred in December when the US provided a helicopter to safely transport Aideed to a peace conference in Ethiopia.¹⁶⁸

The US military role in UNOSOM II fell victim to mission creep for several reasons, most notably the continually changing and inconsistent Clinton policy. Without a clear, unambiguous, and militarily attainable objectives it is virtually impossible to conceive a sufficient campaign plan. Clinton from the onset had two conflicting goals: maintain a small presence with an eye on withdrawing as soon as possible and keep the UN mission from failing. Given the limitations of the UN force and lofty goals of Resolution 814, Clinton's guidance in fact committed US forces to fulfilling the UN mandate.

Montgomery, in an effort to keep the UNOSOM mission from failing increasingly relied on US forces to disarm the Somali factions, and in so doing expanded their mission beyond their original emergency reaction force purpose. Montgomery continued to pursue the primarily political UN objectives exclusively through military means.

Fundamentally, the goals expressed in resolution 814 were entirely political; specifically, the resolution mandated the political rehabilitation and social reconciliation of Somalia. However, UNOSOM II, lacking any political and diplomatic initiatives, tried to obtain their goals by purely military means. Unlike UNITAF, the US contingent during UNOSOM II proceeded without the benefit of political negotiations to secure cooperation. Instead US forces were faced with confronting the well armed Somali clans, some of which did not agree with the UN goal of imposing a democratic form of government. Given Somali history it is not surprising that some Somalis would rise in armed resistance to an outside power imposing a government upon them by force.

After the 5 June ambush of the Pakistanis by the SNA, the US policy in Somalia evolved into a war with Aideed. Montgomery's plans sought the capture of Aideed

exclusive of any political operations. Montgomery referred to Aideed as the "SNA center of gravity" and further stated that "if you're fighting the SNA go after Aideed."¹⁶⁹ Clinton's decision to deploy special forces to capture Aideed was nothing short a decision to wage a war against the SNA. Even if successful in capturing Aideed, accomplishment of the broad UN objectives would be far from complete. No consideration was given by Montgomery or the administration that in light of Somali history and social structure a rival clan leader or one of Aideed's own followers would rise to assume the role of UN antagonist. In sum, the plan followed by Montgomery, even if successful, would not have resulted in the attainment of the UNOSOM objectives. Military commanders continued to hunt Aideed not realizing the Clinton's policy was changing yet again.

The administration allowed the military campaign to continue even after it had rejected a purely military approach and decided to pursue a political settlement. Even after this change the political and military efforts were not coordinated. Working through the UN, the US diplomats failed to restart the negotiations, and the military leaders were unsuccessful in obtaining the equipment to achieve their mission. Later Clinton and Wisner would admit that the major problem with US strategy was it sought to achieve political results through purely military means.¹⁷⁰ The absence of political element in the operations doomed them to failure.

The involvement of UNOSOM II forces against Aideed marked the end of UN and US impartiality. Originally seen as saviors, the US forces in Somalia were increasingly being viewed by Somalis as just another foreign invader.¹⁷¹ As attacks against Aideed increased, Somalis who were previously sympathetic to UNOSOM now began to side with Aideed.¹⁷² As raids designed to capture Aideed continued to fail, Aideed became somewhat of a Somali folk hero reminiscent of the Mad Mulla. In choosing to support some clans while deciding to fight others, the UN and the US had become merely another party in Somalia's factional wars.¹⁷³ Robert Oakley foresaw the devastating effects of the change in military mission brought on by resolution 837 and concluded that "the military

operation jeopardizes the lives of Americans in Somalia, the entire Somalia mission, and the concept of peacekeeping in general."¹⁷⁴ Oakley's prophecy came to fruition on 3 October 1993.

V. Conclusions

What started as a mission to feed starving civilians ended in a failed attack on a Somalia warlord. The Bush administration had started the US intervention in Somalia with established objectives which were clearly defined and limited: feed the people and get out. These objectives, as General Hoar put it, were "doable." However, the Clinton administration over time evolved a contradictory and ambiguous policy toward Somalia. Initially Clinton committed only a small US force to UNOSOM II. The decision to keep US forces was more political than military as it was seen as the only way to show US support for the UN mission. Intended to act as a reaction force to help the UN, the small 1200 man US QRF was only to respond in the event of an emergency. However, the Clinton administration eventually changed its policy to mirror the broad objectives envisioned in the UN nation building mandate encapsulated in UN Resolution 814 and later 837. Although the mandates' objectives were clearly political in nature, calling for the political reconciliation and rehabilitation of the government, the US and UN operations in Somalia surprisingly lacked political military coordination at the strategic level.

The political diplomatic momentum gained during Restore Hope did not continue during UNOSOM II. Neither the UN nor the US continued the sort of close military-diplomatic cooperation during UNOSOM II that had been achieved in Restore Hope. In August and September Albright and Christopher were unable to get the UN to restart diplomatic initiatives with the SNA and were unwilling to usurp the UN's authority by

pursuing separate US lead negotiations directly with Aideed. Even more surprising was that General Powell, the senior military advisor to the President, was apparently uninformed that the administration was now trying to seek a political solution in Somalia.

Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense was continuing to emphasize military operations in August and September as evidenced by his speech at the National Strategic Studies Institute while the Department of State was trying to restart a diplomatic settlement.¹⁷⁵ The political and military efforts were at best uncoordinated. Clinton's policy was also contradictory.

Clinton's policy was to keep the US presence small while at the same time he directed that the UN mission must not fail. As a result, US military operations in Somalia expanded to fulfilling UN objectives. Due to the political and diplomatic atrophy existing in Somalia the UN and US tried to achieve the nation building objectives by purely military means. After the June ambush of the Pakistanis both the UN and US objectives degenerated into a manhunt for Aideed and disarmament within Mogadishu. Yet, both Hoar and Powell had previously advised against such a course even with the much larger and more capable UNITAF force. In sum, the Clinton objectives were unattainable given the small force and lack of political diplomatic operations.

Even with the deployment of TF Ranger the senior military leadership was doubtful of success. However, even if TF Ranger had accomplished its mission, it is unlikely that this alone would have caused the UN nation building mission to succeed given the Somalia social, cultural, and historical factors. Aideed's capture would no more have assured peace and social rehabilitation in Somalia any more than the fall of Said Barre had two years earlier. Therefore, the military means were not in consonance with the ultimate political aims. Clinton's policy was uncoordinated, contradictory, and based upon flawed presumptions. Without the benefit of a clearly defined political aim achievable through military means the formulation of an adequate operational plan and objectives were

virtually impossible. Yet, there were significant factors at the operational level which contributed to the failed US intervention in Somalia.

It was General Montgomery's task to assign tactical missions to the QRF. Increasingly both Montgomery and Hoar depended upon the QRF to perform missions to achieve the UN objectives which were well beyond their original mission of an emergency reaction force. Given the evolving US policy to ensure the success of the UN and Montgomery's great discretionary powers as both the Deputy UN Commander and Commander of US Forces in Somalia, he was responsible for the mission creep that the QRF experienced.

Montgomery increasingly used the QRF to conduct disarmament operations which seemed to the participants to be randomly conducted with no apparent end state or objective in mind. Although UN headquarters developed plans there were no clearly identified end states which connected the tactical operations to the UN objectives. Instead the QRF operations were conducted "under the guise of force protection."¹⁷⁶ Rather than increase force protection the weapons seizure operations only escalated the level of violence. In addition, the QRF organization and composition was never adjusted to address their greatly expanded role. However, the change in mission alone was not necessarily disastrous if those changes were directly linked to accomplishing the ultimate political objectives and the composition of the force and military means made them attainable. In this case, however, the disarmament operations conducted by the US QRF would not only fail to achieve the broad political objectives of national reconciliation but were indeed the source of escalation of hostilities between the Somalis and the UN forces.

Montgomery identified the SNA as the enemy, and Aideed as the "center of gravity."¹⁷⁷ Yet, this assessment belies the fact that capturing Aideed would not in itself achieve the broad UN goals. Declaring war against the SNA also ignored the likelihood that this would destroy US legitimacy and impartiality. War against the SNA made any future progress toward national reconciliation very difficult as the US became increasingly viewed in the same light as the colonial powers of the past who sought to impose their

own versions of government on the Somali people. Following the belief that Aideed was the "center of gravity" Montgomery supported Howe's request for special forces to capture the warlord. Later both Clinton and Aspin justified their decision to deploy TF Ranger based upon the fact that the on the scene commander supported the request. The capture of Aideed thus became a strategic and operational objective in and of itself with no clear connection to the nation building goals. Although Montgomery supported the use of special forces the employment of those forces was left to General Hoar.

General Hoar exercised operational control of TF Ranger in Somalia. Admittedly, Hoar never considered the possibility of the sort of disaster that befell TF Ranger on 3 October even after several previous raids had failed and the Somalis had increased their use of RPGs and had begun to target US aircraft.¹⁷⁸ As a result, the raids continued on unabated. Furthermore Montgomery's request for armor, which if sent may have helped in the rescue attempt, was not presented to Secretary Aspin as a necessary component for the TF Ranger mission.¹⁷⁹ Task Force Ranger operations proceeded despite the increasing risks and lack of adequate force protection. Failure of this single tactical operation produced the reversal of national policy when five days after the 3 October raid Clinton announced the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia. The TF Ranger tragedy provides several lessons for future US involvement in UN peace operations.

UN resolutions are not an acceptable replacement for clear policy aims and a sufficient operational plan.¹⁸⁰ Without such a clear policy there can be no concrete operational objectives or measurable end states.¹⁸¹ The US experience in Somalia shows that a lack of clear policy focus produces a lack of operational focus increasing the risk of mission creep. The lack of a coherent policy does not, however, abrogate the responsibility of the operational commander to determine clear military objectives and subsequent end states, recognizing, as Johnston did, that political and diplomatic elements of power may be the focus of operations. Operational level commanders must define clear end states that when executed achieve the intended political objectives. They must also consider the possibility

of tactical failures and the subsequent results on national policy. If the national policy is so fragile that it cannot survive a single tactical disaster then either the military means or the policy are severely flawed and requires re-examination. Major General Garrison commented, "I always said that if we ever got in a fire fight we would win the battle but lose the war."¹⁸² Based upon this statement and the apparent risks identified from the onset the military means used were not in consonance with the political will. Furthermore, the UN showed itself incapable of conducting peacekeeping operations in anything but the most benign environments. The US should hesitate to participate as part of a UN force in the future unless the UN objectives are closely tied to US national interests and then only in situations where political and diplomatic agreements promise the cooperation of the belligerents.

Embarking on a peace operation even under the best of intentions and the approval of the parties involved does not guarantee that the US will maintain its legitimacy. Efforts to impose our own social values and democratic form of government on others threatens US legitimacy and can only end in disaster. Both political and military leaders must take the time to examine the unique social, cultural, geo-political, and economic factors involved in each particular crisis and adapt our policies to those factors before setting out on a crusade. In peace operations the objectives are largely political and contingent upon some measure of cooperation. Therefore, without political and diplomatic success, military operations alone will almost assuredly fail in peace operations.

These issues are particularly relevant to the US military involvement in Bosnia today. Political and military leaders struggle with US policy in regard to the responsibility for locating and apprehending suspected Serbian war criminals many of whom are senior Serbian military officials and political leaders. This and perceived US favoritism toward the Bosnian Muslims could easily delegitimize US efforts at fostering a lasting peace and make the US, once again a party to the conflict. Certainly any attempt to militarily coerce the Serbians to hand-over suspected war criminals may threaten Serbian political and

military autonomy causing them to resist. In light of these possibilities US policy and military operations in Bosnia may, as it did in Somalia, directly conflict with the ultimate objective of establishing a peaceful environment. These questions are yet unanswered and compel re-examination. Before commencing peace operations in the future senior political and military authorities should learn the lessons of Lebanon and Somalia and resist the temptation to go beyond what is achievable.

END NOTES

¹ Bernard Adelsberger, "Ranger Parents: Who Made Somalia Decisions?" Army Times May 23 1994: Cover Story, and 14.

² Ibid.

³ For examples of media coverage of deployment and use of the US special operations task force in Somalia see Mark Fineman, "UN Continues to Have Bad Luck," Los Angeles Times August 31 1993, A2. John M. Broder, and Mark Pine, "US Blames Bad Intelligence in Raid in Somalia," Los Angeles Times August 31 1993, A2. Eric Schmitt, "US Forces to Stay in Somalia to End Warlord Violence," New York Times August 28 1993, sec. A: A1,A4. Eric Schmitt, "More GI's Going to Somalia," New York Times August 24 1993, sec. A: A1.

⁴ Mission creep is not a doctrinal US Army term. There are several and widely distinct definitions of the term used by various authors. In this monograph the author adopts a unique definition albeit similar to other commonly held descriptions. One of the most common definitions of mission creep is presented by John E. Peters and Jennifer Morrison Taw, Operations Other Than War: Implications For The US Army (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1995) 13-27. Peters and Morrison define mission creep as "new or shifting political guidance requires military operations different from what the intervening force initially planned." (page 22) The author of this monograph further limits the definition by including the requirement that such changes in the military missions must conflict directly with the intended purpose of the operations objectives.

⁵ Daniel P Bolger, Savage Peace (Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995) 267. and Walter S. Clarke, Somalia Background Information on Operation Restore Hope (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1992) 6.

⁶ Ahmed I. Samatar, "From Catastrophe to Renewal," The Somali Challenge (Boulder Co: Lynne Rienner Publishing Inc, 1994) 236-237. and Clarke, 5-9.

⁷ Samatar, 7.

⁸ For detailed information on Somali clan culture see Gerald Hanley, Warriors: Life and Death Among the Somalis (London, England: Eland Publishing, 1993). Terrence Lyon and Ahmed Samatra, State Colapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstitution, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution). Samatra, 7-10. and Clarke, 6.

⁹ For information on Somali societal values and norms see Samatar, 237-239.

¹⁰ See Bolger, 268. Clarke, 16-20. and see also Lyons, 11.

- ¹¹ Samatar, 7.
- ¹² For information on Somali colonial wars see Lawrence James, The Savage Wars (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1985) 151-156. and see also Clarke 16-20.
- ¹³ See Bolger, 269. Clarke, 20. James 184-190 and Lyons, 11.
- ¹⁴ Clarke, 10.
- ¹⁵ Hanley, 21.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 4 and 21.
- ¹⁷ For detailed account of inter-clan violence see Handley. For background on Somali borders see Bolger, 269-270.
- ¹⁸ See Bolger, 270. and Clarke, 9-10.
- ¹⁹ See Bolger 270-271. and Clarke 10-13.
- ²⁰ For information on Siad Barre government and repression see Bolger 271-272. Lyons, 15-19. and Samatar 153-155,171.
- ²¹ Samatar, 154.
- ²² For disintegration of Barre's government see Bolger, 272. and Clarke 12-16.
- ²³ *ibid.*
- ²⁴ Bolger, 273. and for description of Somali famine see Robert B. Oakley, "Envoy's perspective," Joint Focus Quarterly no 2 (Autumn 1993): 45.
- ²⁵ See Bolger, 275-279.
- ²⁶ Oakley, 45.
- ²⁷ Ibid., Bolger, 280-281.
- ²⁸ Oakley, 44-45.
- ²⁹ Ibid.,52.
- ³⁰ For information on US strategy determination see John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," Foreign Affairs 73/1 (Jan-Feb 1994): 59. and see also Oakley, 45-46.

- ³¹ See United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, (3 Dec 1992): 2,4. see also Oakley, 46.
- ³² Bolton, 60.
- ³³ See UN Res 794, 2. and Bolton, 60.
- ³⁴ Bolton, 60.
- ³⁵ For information on Bush's reaction to UN Res 794 see Oakley, 54. See also Lyons, 34. and Bolton, 59-60.
- ³⁶ For information on the formation of US military objectives in Somalia see Waldo Freeman Major USA, "Operation Restore Hope: A USCENTCOM Perspective," Military Review 73/9 (Sep 1993): 63. and General Joseph P. Hoar, "CINC's Perspective," Joint Forces Quarterly 2 (Autumn 1993): 58.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 64 and 62.
- ³⁸ Clarke, 39. Hoar, 58. Freeman, 67. Oakley, 48,51.
- ³⁹ Bolger, 288.
- ⁴⁰ For IMEF exercise see Freeman, 62.
- ⁴¹ For Johnston's operational mission and intent see David J. Zvijac and Katherine A. W. McGrady, Operation Restore Hope: Summary Report (Norfolk VA: Center For Naval Analysis, 1994) 2, 14, 19.
- ⁴² For UNITAF endstates see Zvijac, 45, 24-27 and 14.
- ⁴³ Freeman, 63.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ For description of political preparations for intervention in Somalia see Oakley, 46.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 39, 47.
- ⁴⁷ See Freeman, 63. Oakley, 48. and Zvijac 15.
- ⁴⁸ Tom Donnely et al, "Somalia After action Review: Warriors or Angels -- Case of Mission Creep effects Soldiers," Army Times July 5 1993: 13.
- ⁴⁹ For description of the phased conduct of military operations see Zvicjac, 36, 45-46.

⁵⁰ Freeman, 63.

⁵¹ For a description of the typical five phased tactical operation see US Department of the Army, Headquarters 10th Mountain Division, US Army Forces Somalia After Action Report For Operation Restore Hope (Ft Drum, NY: US Department of the Army, 1993) 7. Hereafter referred to as 10th Division AAR.

⁵² For information on the size, composition, mission, and area of operations for forces in Somalia see UN Department of Public Information, "The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia," UN Reference Paper (30 April 1993): 8. and UN Department of Public Information, "Operation Restore Hope," UN Chronicle (March 1993) 13-16. For description of Oakley's and Johnston's threat of force to coerce cooperation from the warlords see Oakley, 47.

⁵³ See Zvijac, 52.

⁵⁴ See 10th Division AAR, 13.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 31.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 48.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 6-7, 34.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 7, 40-43.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 23.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² See 10th Division AAR, 76-77, 59, 12.

⁶³ See Lyons, Hoar, and Crigler, who describe disarmament operations in terms of arms control.

⁶⁴ See Hoar.

⁶⁵ Zvijac, 50.

⁶⁶ For description of the conditions in Somalia see 10th Division AAR, 10.

⁶⁷ See 10th Division AAR, 24.

- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Zvijak, 59.
- 71 For measures of success in Somalia see Oackley, 51. Hoar, 62. and Zvijac, 3.
- 72 Bolger 296.
- 73 Zvijac, 61.
- 74 10th division AAR, 49.
- 75 Ibid., 5.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 US Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington DC: Headquarter Department of the Army, June 1993) 13-4. Definition of legitimacy: "sustain the willing acceptance of the people by the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions."
- 79 10th Division AAR, 16.
- 80 John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," Foreign Affairs 73/1 (Jan-Feb 1994): 56-62.
- 81 Crigler, 66.
- 82 See United Nation Security Council Resolution 814 dated 26 March 1993, 4. Hereafter referred to UNSCR 814.
- 83 Crigler, 66.
- 84 UNSCR 814, 3.
- 85 Ibid., 1.
- 86 Ibid., 1,4. and see also Senators John W. Warner and Carl Levin. "Senate Subcommittee Report on Somalia: Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu Somalia," dated 29 September, 1995 (Washington D.C.: US Senate Committee on Armed Services): 16. Hereafter referred to

as Warner Report.

⁸⁷ UNSCR 814, 2.

⁸⁸ Center For army Lessons Learned, US Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994) I-1-6. Hereafter referred to as CALL UNOSOM II Report.

⁸⁹ Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?" Foreign Policy no 91 (Summer 1993): 141.

⁹⁰ Warner Report, 17.

⁹¹ Crigler, 66. and see Hoar, 63.

⁹² Crigler p.66. Bolton, 56,63. and see also WCPD, Clinton speech to returning UNITAF soldiers, 755. Alluding to the new role for US forces in "assertive multilateralism" Clinton in a speech welcoming home the UNITAF troops stated ". . . increasingly in the new era we will need to work with an array of multinational partners, often in new arrangements."

⁹³ Crigler, 66. and Hoar, 62-63.

⁹⁴ CALL UNOSOM II Report, 25.

⁹⁵ UNOSOM II, OPLAN 2, 24.

⁹⁶ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 10 June 1993, Clinton letter to Congress. p.1060-1061. Clinton stated that general Montgomery "is authorized to send the QRF into action as may be necessary as envisioned in response to such situations the QRF was called on to assist in quelling violence against the lawful activities of UNOSOM II in implimenting the UN mandate."

⁹⁷ For command structure see Hoar, 62. and CALL UNOSOM II Report, 5.

⁹⁸ UN Department of Public Information. "Somalia Objectives Reaffirmed," UN Chronicle, 30 no 4(Dec 1993) 26. see UNOSOM troop strength.

⁹⁹ UN Department of Public Information. "30,000 Strong Force Steps in to Restore Hope," UN Chronicle 30 no 1 (June 1993): 15. The article states that disarmament of the clans would occur in phase I of the UNOSOM plan. In Phase II disarmament would expand into the entire country.

¹⁰⁰ UNOSOM OPLAN 2, p.C-8-2. The intent of the disarmament operations were to "reduce weapons and ordanance of all types," and authorized commanders to use all

necissary means. The annex on diarmament operations also required all subordinate commanders to "develope plans and execute weapons confiscation programs in his area of responsibility."

101 See 10th Mountain Division AAR and Task Force Mountain AAR, 27.

102 For QRF mission see CALL UNOSOM II Report, 8.

103 Warner Report, 17 and 18.

104 CALL UNOSOM II Report, I-3-1.

105 Headquarter Department of the Army, 1st Battalion, 22 Infantry, After Action Report, (Ft Drum, NY: 24 Sep 1993). Hereafter refered to as 1-22 AAR.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid., 75.

109 Warner Report p.43, 18. quotes Major General Freeman, "We had two conflicting policies - support the UN and don't let it fail in Somalia; and get US forces out of Somalia as soon as possible."

110 Hoar as quoted in testimony before the Senate, see Werner Report, 18,19.

111 Warner Report, 44.

112 Ibid., 18.

113 Ibid., 19.

114 Ibid., 18-19.

115 Oakley, 53.

116 Crigler, 68.

117 Lyons, 42-43.

118 Crigler, 68.

119 Oakley, 47,53.

- ¹²⁰ Oakley, 53. For Somali popular support of Aideed see also Bruce B. Auster and Louise Lief. "The Unmaking of Foreign Policy," US New & World Report (October 1993): 37.
- ¹²¹ See Crigler p.68
- ¹²² Ibid.
- ¹²³ Ibid.
- ¹²⁴ UN department of Public Information, "UNOSOM II Takes Decisive Action to Restore Peace," UN Chronicle 30 no 3 (Sep 1993): 5.
- ¹²⁵ UN Department of Public Information. "Objectives Reaffirmed," UN Chronicle, 30 no 4 (Dec 1993): 26. and Warner Report, 20.
- ¹²⁶ Bolger, 289.
- ¹²⁷ Warner Report, 20.
- ¹²⁸ For more complete account of these actions see Bolger, 299-300. see also Headquarters 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Task Force Mountain Warrior After Action Review (Ft Drum, NY. 19 August 1993): 5. Here after referred to as TF Mountain Warrior AAR.
- ¹²⁹ See United Nations Security Council Resolution 837, dated 6 June 1993. Hereafter referred to as UNSCR 837.
- ¹³⁰ UN Chronicle, "UNOSOM II", 5.
- ¹³¹ Lyons, 58.
- ¹³² See TF Mountain Warrior AAR, 6-11.
- ¹³³ Bolger, 303.
- ¹³⁴ For examples of SNA escalation in Mogadishu see Crigler 68,70. and also Bolger 298-303.
- ¹³⁵ For General Hoar's and other senior military leaders testimony before Congress in regard to use of special operations forces in Somalia see Warner Report, 23-27.
- ¹³⁶ Ibid., 24-25.
- ¹³⁷ Crigler, 69. For Italian Contingent in Somalia see UN Chronicle, "Objectives

Reaffirmed", 26.

¹³⁸ Warner Report, 18.

¹³⁹ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, "Remarks Following Discussion with President San Nujome of Namibia," vol 29 no 24 (June 16 1993): 1093. Hereafter referred to as WCPD.

¹⁴⁰ Bolton, 64.

¹⁴¹ Eric Schmitt. "US Forces to Stay in Somalia to End Warlord Violence," New York Times (August 1993): A1-A5.

¹⁴² Ibid., A5.

¹⁴³ See Bolger, 305-307.

¹⁴⁴ For examples of media coverage of the deployment of TF Ranger see Eric Schmitt, "US Troops raise Stakes in Somalia," New York Times 25 August 1993, sec. A: A5. and Scmitt, "More GIs Going to Somalia," New York Times 24 August 1993, sec. A: A1.

¹⁴⁵ See Warner Report, 37.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 38.

¹⁴⁸ For chronology of Somali escalation of activities against US and UN forces see CALL UNOSOM II Report, Appendix K (Chronology).

¹⁴⁹ For SNA use of RPG see Bolger, 311.

¹⁵⁰ Bolger, 305.

¹⁵¹ Casualty figures see UN Chronicle, "Objectives Reaffirmed," 25.

¹⁵² Montgomery testimony before Congress as quoted in Werner Report, 32. Requests for armor support see Werner Report, 25. For description of combat action of US engineers who were ambushed see TF Mountain Warrior AAR, 6-10. See also Bolger 32-35.

¹⁵³ Warner Report, 33.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

155 Ibid., 44, Powell stated in testimony before Congress that as of his last meeting with Clinton he was unaware of the Secretary of State's policy paper to the UN urging political settlement.

156 For Congressional testimony on the armor request for US Forces in Somalia see Warner Report, 32-35, 44.

157 Warner Report, 35.

158 Elaine Sciolino, "Puzzle in Somalia: US Goal," New York Times Oct 5 1993, sec. A: A8.

159 See Auster, 36.

160 Bolger, 313.

161 Warner Report, 45.

162 Auster, US News, 36.

163 See Bolger, 317-326.

164 For accounts of combat actions of TF Ranger and the QRF on 3 October 1993 see Bolger, 317-326. see also Charles P. Ferry, CPT USA, "Personal Account of a Rifle Company Executive Officer," Battle of the Black Sea Break Through to Task Force Ranger (Ft Benning GA.: US Army Infantry Center, Student Paper, Oct 1993) 14. and Headquarters Department of the Army, Aviation (Falcon) Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Quick Reaction Force After Action Report. (Ft. Drum NY.: 3 Oct 1993).

165 WCPD, "Address to the Nation on Somalia," vol 29 no 40 (7 October 1993): 2022, 2066. see also Ruth Marcus, Barton Gellman, "Clinton to Double Force in Somalia," Washington Post, article (8 Oct 1993.): 1.

166 R.W. Apple, "Clinton Sending Reinforcements After Heavy Losses in Somalia," New York Times (Oct 4 1993): sec. A: A1, A8.

167 Donatella Lorch, "After Raid Somalis Struggle With Anger and Weariness," New York Times (20 Oct 1993) 1. and Douglas Jehl, "UN Envoy Determined to Disarm Factions," New York Times (20 Oct 1993):12.

168 Rowan Scarborough, "Once-Targeted Somali Warlord Gets US Escort," Washington Times (3 Dec 1993).

169 Warner Report, 23.

- 170 See Warner, 44. and WCPD, 7 Oct 93, 2023.
- 171 Stevenson, 140.
- 172 Crigler, 69. Oakley, 53.
- 173 Crigler, 70.
- 174 Sciolino, NYT, A8.
- 175 For excerpts of Aspin speech see Schmitt, NYT.
- 176 Warner Report, 40.
- 177 Warner Report, 23. In testimony before Congress Montgomery stated: "He [Aideed] was the Somali National army's center of gravity . . . If your fighting the SNA, go after Aideed."
- 178 Warner Report, 39. In testimony before Congress General Hoar stated, "The risk I always thought of was the risk of failure, i.e. the risk of not capturing Aideed alive, which would be failure because he was a national hero. I never addressed in my own mind the October 3-4 result."
- 179 For discussion on the possible effect of armor during the 3-4 Oct raid see Werner Report, 32-33. Unanimously all the US commanders in Somalia believed armor would have saved lives.
- 180 Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington D.C.: Institute For National Strategic Studies, 1995) 93.
- 181 Ibid.
- 182 See Warner Report, 38.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.
- Bolger, Daniel P. Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s. Navato CA.: Presidio Press, 1995.
- Hirsch, John., and Robert B.Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995.
- James, Lawrence. The Savage Wars. New York NY: St Martins Press, 1995.
- Hanley, Gerald. Warriors: Life and Death of Somalis. London.: Eland Co Publishing, 1993.
- Samatar Ahmed I. The Somali Challenge. "From Catastrophe to Renewal." Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1994.

JOURNALS AND PERIODICALS

- Adelsberger, Bernard. "Ranger Parent: Who Made Somalia Decisions?" Army Times (May 23 1994):Cover Story.
- Apple R. W. "Clinton Sends Reinforcements After Heavy Losses In Somalia." New York Times (Oct 4 1993): A1, A8.
- Auster, Bruce and Louise Lief. "Somalia What Went Wrong." US News and World Report 115 (18 Oct 1993): 30-37.
- Bolton, John R. "Wrong Turn in Somalia ." Foreign Affairs 73 (Jan-Feb 1994): 56-66.
- Broder, John M. and Mark Pine. "US Blames Bad Intelligence in Raid in Somalia." Las Angeles Times. (31 Aug 1993):A2
- Clarke, Jeffery. "Debacle in Somalia." Foreign Affairs 72 No 1 (1993):109-123.
- Crigler, Frank T. "The Peace -Enforcement Dilemma." Joint Forces Quarterly.

(Autumn 1993): 64-70.

Donnelly, Tom et al. "Somalia After Action Review: Warriors or Angels - Case of Mission Creep Afflicts Soldiers." Army Times 53 no 9 (July 5 1993) 8.

Fineman, Mark. "UN Continues to Have Bad Luck ." Los Angeles Times. (31 Aug 1993): A2.

Freeman, Waldo D. "Operation restore Hope: A US CENTCOM Perspective." Military Review. 73 No 9 (Sep 1993): 61-72.

Hoar, Joseph P General USA. "A CINC's Perspective." Joint Forces Quarterly. (Autumn 1993): 56-63.

Hayden, Thomas H. LTC USMC. "What Went Wrong in Somalia." Marine Corps Gazette 78 no 9 (Sep 1994) 54-52.

Huntington, Samuel. "New Contingencies Old Roles." Joint Forces Quarterly. (Autumn 1993): 38-43.

Jehl, Douglas. "UN Envoy Determined to Disarm Factions." New York Times. (20 Oct 1993): 12.

Marcus, Ruth and Barton Gellman. "Clinton to Double Force in Somalia." Washington Post. (8 Oct 1993): 1.

Lorch, Donatella. "After Raid Somalis Struggle With Anger and Weariness." New York Times. (20 Oct 1993): 1.

Oackley, Robert B. "Somalia Lessons Invaluable for US and UN." Army Times (4 April 1994): 33.

Oakley, Robert B. "Envoys's Perspective." Joint Forces Quarterly. (Autumn 1993): 44-55.

Scarborough, Rowan. "Once Targeted Somalia Warlord Gets US Escort." Washington Times. (3 Dec 1993).

Schmitt, Eric. "US Troops Raise Stakes In Somalia." New York Times (24 Aug 1993): A5.

Schmitt, Eric. "US Forces To Stay In Somalia To End Warlord Violence." New York Times (28 Aug 1993): A1.

- Sciolino, Elaine. "Puzzle in Somalia: US Goal." New York Times (5 Oct 1993): A8.
- Stevenson, Jonathan. "Hope Restored In Somalia." Foreign Policy. no 9 (Summer 1993): 12.
- United Nations. "Operation restore Hope." UN Chronicle 30 no 1 (March 1993): 13-20.
- _____. "30,000 Strong UN Force Steps in to Restore Hope." UN Chronicle 30 no 2 (June 1993): 13-20.
- _____. "UNOSOM II Takes Decisive Action to Restore Peace." UN Chronicle 30 no 3 (Sep 1993): 4-7.
- _____. "Somalia: Objectives Affirmed Despite Continuing Violence." UN Chronicle 30 no 4 (Dec 1993): 24-27.
- _____. "Fundamental Review of UNISOM II (UN Operations in Somalia) Follows Violence." UN Chronicle 31 (Mar 1994): 51-54.
- _____. "UNISOM II Mandate Renewed, Humanitarian Aspect Stressed." UN Chronicle. 31 (Sep 1994): 21-23.

US GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

- Clinton, William. "Remarks Welcoming Home Military Personnel From Somalia." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 29 no 18 (5 May 1993): 755.
- _____. "Remarks Following Discussions With President San Nujoma of Namibia." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 29 no 24 (16 June 1993): 1093-1094.
- _____. "Letters to Congressional Leaders on Somalia." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 29 (5 July 1993): 1216- 1217.
- _____. "Address to the Nation on Somalia on 7 Oct." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 29 (11 Oct 1993): 2022-2025.
- _____. "Message to Congress Transmitting a Report on Somalia, Oct 13." Weekly Compilation of presidential Documents. 29 (18 Oct 1993): 2065-2066.
- US Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. "Operations Other Than War: Restore Hope." CALL Case Study. Ft Leavenworth KS.: 16 Aug 1993.
- _____. Center for Army Lessons Learned. "Lessons Learned Report." US Army

Operations in Support of UNISOM II. Ft Leavenworth KS.: Mar 1994.

_____. Field Manual 100-5: Operations. Washington, D.C.: 14 June 1993.

Warner, John W. and Carl Levin, US Senators. "Review of Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Oct 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia." Senate Subcommittee Report on Somalia. United States Senate, Washington D.C.: 29 Sep 1995.

DOCUMENTS, STUDIES, AND PAPERS

Clarke, Walter S. Somalia Background Information for Operation Restore Hope. Carlisle Barracks PA.: Department of National Security Strategy, 1992.

Lyon, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstitution. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995.

Ferry, Charles P. "Personal Account of a Rifle Company Executive Officer," The Battle of the Black Sea (Breakthrough to TF Ranger) 3-4 Oct 1993 Mogadishu Somalia. Ft Benning GA.: Student Paper, US Army Infantry Center, 1993.

Peters, John E. and Jennifer Morrison Taw, Operations Other Than War: Implications For The US Army. Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1995.

United Nations. "UN Reference Paper." The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, New York, NY UN Department of Public Information, 30 April 1993.

United Nations, Headquarters United Nations Operations in Somalia II. UNOSOM II OPLAN 1. Mogadishu, Somalia, 2 May 1993.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, 3 Dec 1992.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 814, 26 Mar 1993.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 837, 6 June 1993.

US Army Forces Somalia. After Action Report. Ft Drum NY: Headquarters 10th Mountain Division Light, 2 June 1993.

_____. After Action Report. Ft Drum NY.: Task Force Mountain Warrior, 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, 10 Apr-7 Aug 1993, 30 Sep 1993.

_____. After Action Report. Ft Drum NY.: 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division,
subject: Lessons Learned From E/87 Engagement on 16 Jan 1993.

_____. After Action Report. Ft Drum NY.: Falcon Brigade, 10th Mountain Division,
Oct 1993.

_____. After Action Report. Ft Drum NY.: 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 10th
Mountain Division, 24 Sep 1993.

Zvijac, David and Katherine A. W. McGrady. Operation Restore Hope: Summary Report.
Norfolk VA.: Center For Naval Analysis, 1994.